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of LEWIS WARREN SMITH, Deceased. BRAN-
FORD BAPTIST CHURCH, Apptllant, •. A].IY 
,EDITH NICHOLS, Respondent; WELLS FARGO 
. BANK'" UNION TRUST CO., as Executor, etc. 
Marriage-PresumptioDS and Burden of Proof.-When a per-
aon has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption 
arises in favor of the validity of the second marriage, and 
. the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second 
'marriage to prove that the first mnrri:lge had not been dis-
• 'Solved by the death of a spouse or by divorce or had not been 
auulled at the time of the second marriage, 
an estate proceeding, the evidence sup-
a finding that a ClllimllDt wns the 'trife of th" tcstntor 
time of his death, where she tcstified thllt she cntrrccl 
• a marriage ceremony with another m::m in rdiancl\ on a 
by the testator that he hnd obtained a divorce, 
the testator's denth she was unable to find nny 
of a divorce, and that she did not receive any divorce 
papers or notice of a divorce action from the testator; where 
there was other evidence that her marriage to the testator 
.. Jaad not been dissolved by divorce; and where the testator, 
who was not shown to have married again, bequeathed a sum 
.,tmoney to his "wife." 
BrldeD.C4""':Heaniay·-]~cept;iol18 to Rulc-Pedigree.-Decl:ll'a-
a deceased person that he was dh'orced from his 
widow and that she was ht'! "cx-wife," nre admissible 
exception to the 'hearsay rule. (Code Ch'. Prue., 
16 Cal.Jur. 928,934; 35 Am.Jur. 306,315. 
.. 10 CaLJur.ll06j 20 Am.Jur. 412 . 
. Dig. References: [1] l\'[arringe, §§ 27, 28; [2J M:ming-e, 
E"'idence, 5257; [4] Appeal and Error, §1613; [G]llar-
27(7). 
) 
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BO :IS to rebut the presumption of the v:llidity ot n ~uh!lI'(IUrnt, 
marri:lge, it is not neClt'Sllnry to provt', fhnt lin "xIIDlin'ltion 
was made of the public rerot'ds of juriRdirtion!l other thlln 
those in which the pnrtic8 to the first marrisge were domiciled. 
APPEAL from a judgment of t.he Superior Court of the 
City and County of Snn Francisco decret'inl(' dwtribution 9£ 
an estate. T. I. Fitzpatrick, Judge. Affirmed. 
Jay A. Darwin and Clifton E. Brooks for Appellant. 
Weinmann, Moffitt & Quayle and Cyril Viadro for 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Lewis Warren Smith died on May 28, 
1945, leaving a holographic will dated April 7, 1942. By his 
will he bequeathed "to my wife the sum of Five Dollars" 
and $500 to the widows' and orphans' fund of a lodge of 
Masons, and left the residue of his estate to the Branford 
Baptist Church of Connecticut. 
Amy Edith Smith, respondent, filed a claim against the 
estate alleging that she is the wido\v of the testator. She 
claims that she is entitled to two-thirds of the estate on the 
ground that charitable bequests under section 41 of the Pro-
bate Code may not collectively exceed· one-third of the estate 
as against the spouse of the decedent. 
It is undisputed that respondent married the testator in 
January, 1926, and that they lived together until 1932 or 
1933. It is also undisputed that in November, 1938, respond-
ent entered into a marriage ceremony with Ralph N. Nichols, 
with whom she lived until May 13, 1945. After evidence was 
introduced relating to the marital status of respondent, the 
probate court found that respondent was the widow of the 
testator, and entered a decree of distribution, ordering that 
two-thirds of the residue of the estate be distributed to her. 
After completion of the hearing in the probate proceedinltS 
but before the entry of the decree, Ralph N. Nichols, who had 
previously commenced a divorce action against respondent, 
filed an amended complaint, in which he requested an annul-
ment on the ground that at the time of respondent's marriage 
to him she was married to the testator. Neither Nichols nor 
respondent testified in the annulment proceeding, which was 
held five days after the entry of the decree of distribution in 
the probate proceeding. Counsel for Nichols introduced the 
record of the decree, whereupon the annulment was granted. 
-) 
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Baptist Church appeals from the decree of 
,[1] It is \VeIl established that when a person has entered 
two succ~ssive marriages, a presumption arises in favor 
'; the validity of the second marriage, and the burden is 
.;iilntl'll the party attacking the validity of the second marriage 
that the first marriage had not been dissolved by the 
.C;JA&lW of a spouse or by divorce or had not been annulled at 
time of the second marriage. (Hunter v. Hunter, 111 
.261 [43 P. 756, 52 Am.St.Rep. 180, 31 L.R.A. 411]; 
v. Wilcox, 171 Cal. 770, 774 [155 P. 95]; Estate of 
_ ..... .,. .. "'. 173 Cal. 141, 143 [159 P. 433] ; Estat. 01 Hugkso"-,, 
448, 452 [160 P. 548]; Hamburg" v. Hys, 22 Cal. 
r.;-..PJ".QU 508, 509 [71 P.2d 301] ; Immel v. DO'Wd, 6 Cal.App.2d 
147 [44 P.2d 373].) That burden is sustained if the 
R'lm.:ieIlLce, in the light of all re:lsonable inferences therefrom, 
IP.t.iIlOln1, that the first marriage was not so dissolved or annulled. 
v. Williams, 63 Wis. 58, 66 [23 N.W. 110, 53 Am. 
1I.i"I:~ .... ~,..,I" 253]; Turner v. Williams, 202 Mass. 500, 505 [89 
~4~.;.;Il(.;.110, 24 L.R.A. N.S. 1199]; 8ckmisse1tr v. Beat"e, 147 
210, 217 [35 N.E. 525]; Oole v. OoZe, 153 Ill. 585, 587 
N.E. 703] ; Barnes v. Barnes, 90 Iowa 282, 285 [57 N.W. 
; Oolored Knights 0/ Pytkias v. Tucker, 92. Miss. 501, 
',[46 So. 51]; Brokeskoulder v. Brokeskoulder, 84 Okla . 
. [204 P. 284, 288, 34 A.L.R. 441].) "There can be no 
.\sol:a:te presumption against the continuance of the life of 
to a marriage, in order to establish the innocence 
other party to a subsequent marriage; much less can 
,a rigid presumption of a dissolution of the first 
U'l'lU'e·· by divorce, in order to make out such innocence. . . . 
particular case, -the -question-must be determined, like 
question of Ifact, upon a consideration of the attend. 
and circumstances, and such inferences as fairly and 
[qiII"'I!,aUJLY fiow therefrom." (1 Jones, Commentaries On Evi· 
1I~~i,;J.U'O.UI'J:.) 
_':-,," __ ... ,"'" The question, therefore, is whether there was sub. 
Ml~1tUU· evidence to support the finding of the probate court 
~llati'resP<l,ndent was the wife of the testator at the time of his 
, Respondent testified that before her marriage to Nichols 
she and Nichols visited the testator in a town near 
[t;';Ca:l,ifc~rn:ia; that the testator informed her that he had 
. a divorce and that the divorce papers were in his 
ae]iK>S_lt, box. Respondent entered into a marriage cere. 
) 
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mont'Y with Nichols in reliance upon this information. Re. 
spondent further testified that after the death of the testator 
she made investigations in San Francisco, where she supposed 
that he had resided, and in Los Angeles, where she and the 
testator were married, but was unable to find any record of 
a divorce dissolviJlg their marriage; she made similar investi-
~ations in Lake County, where the testator maintained a place 
for camping, and~n Reno, Nevada, but no record of a divorce 
was discovered. Counsel for the executor stated that he had 
"examined the divorce records of a number of counties," but 
was unable to find any record of divorce in an action involving 
respondent and the testator. After the probate court had 
granted a continuance for the purpose of permitting further 
search, counsel for appellant made an investigation of divorce 
records in California. He stated that he had received reports 
from 56 of the 58 counties of the state, showing uo record of 
a divorce between respondent and the testator. Respondent 
testified that she did not receive any divorce papers or any 
notice of a divorce action from the testator. Although this 
testimony may not in itself be sufficient, it is persuasive when 
considered with other evidence that respondent's marriage 
to the testator had not been dissolved by divorce. 
The trial court could reasonably infer that had an annul-
ment been secured the existence of such a decree would have 
been discovered in the search of records of the various counties 
of the state. Moreover, the provision in the will by which 
the testator bequeathed $5.00 "to my wife" precludes the 
conclusion that he had secured either a divorce or an annul-
ment from rE'spondent. Since there is no evidence that the 
tegtator had married again, the probate court could rCilson~ 
ubly infer that he was referring to respondent by that 
provision. 
[3] Appell811t contends that it was error for the probate 
('(lurt to exclude certain oral declarations of the testator. 
/\. ppellant made an offer of proof to show by the testimony of 
three disinterested witnesses, who were close frit'nds of -the 
.. 'stator living in San Francisco, that the testator had mnde 
f?peated statements· that he was divorced from respondent 
:lnd that she was his "ex-wife." Declarations of a deceased 
pt'rson in respect to his relationship to any person are admissi. 
ble as an except.ion to the hearsay rule. (Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1890(4) : Estate of Friedman, 178 Cal. 27. 35 [172 P. 140]; 
Estate (J/ldor{lan, 208 Cal. 569, 576 [265 P. 241] ; Est-ft·te of 
Strong, 54 Cal.App.2d 604, 608-609 [129 P.2d 493].) Declara-
) 
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tions of the testcltor rl·garding his relatiullship t(. rt'sponut>nt 
were, therefore, ndmil'lsibJe. [4] The refusal to admit them, 
!towever, was not prcjuclicial, for rCl:ipondcnt had previously 
'testified to a similar declaration made to her by the testator. 
: ,The probate court in deciding that the marriage was not 
'.' dissolved may bav.e concluded, in view of the other evidence, 
that the testator made', such statements under a mistaken 
.. belief that he had taken' all the necessary steps in obtaining 
divorce. 
. . [IS] In order to show that no divorce or annulment bad 
_;:~JU obtained it is not necessary to prove that an examination 
made of the public records of jurisdictions other than 
which the parties to the marriage were domiciled . 
• 'IW~maen1l~tna v. Parker, 69 Ca1.App. 685, 686 [231 P. 765] ; 
v. Beatrie, BtI,pm, 147 m. 210, 217; Barne, v. 
B(Jr,~", supra, 90 Iowa 282, 285; see Im.mel v. Dowd, S1tpra, 
Cal.App.2d 145, 147.) It appears from the evidence that 
-',,"',,-_.' his marriage with respondent, the testator entered the 
.... ' .. _ .. " ..... business in Los Angeles and that in 1938 he was living 
Taft, California. He maintained a camping place in 
County and died in San Francisco in 1945. Although 
evidence does not account for evcry place where the 
re~ded during the years following his separation 
Ei;~lm rt!Spondent, it is sUfficient to support a reasonable infer-
.,:ISQ''''' that he was domiciled in California from the time of his 
EJItUP>arfLtioln from respondent until the time of bis,death. Appel-
concedes that the testator was domiciled in San Francisco 
K:jll:nring this period. The o:IIer of proof made by appellant for 
nllrnj[)Se of admitting certain declarations of the testator 
•. 'jltlllll\ved that tbe testator had maintained his headquarters 
1I';~"IU1Ci8' 1930 at the Class A Garage in San Francisco, where 
,'1unJally returned at the end of each fishing season; and 
,he lived at a near by hotel, where he had always received 
C. J., Shenk, .J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and 
., concurred. 
C"U,,JLL.,,,,,,UEB, J.-I dissent. It is my view that respondent 
_~,uwe:a to meet the burden of proving the illegality of her 
...... T ... 'In< to Nichols, that the finding of the probate court that 
aJJ(JlnQ~ent is the widow of the testator is without substantial 
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Impport in thf' evidence, and that the portion of the judg. 
ment appealed from should be reversed. 
For what appears to Die to be a logical and convincing 
refutation of the views taken by the majority of this court, 
reference is made tQ;the opinion prepared by Mr. Presiding 
Justice Peters for tne District Court of Appeal, First Appel-
late District, Division One, reported at (Cal.App.) 193 
P.2d 90. 
In further support of appellant's position herein, and of 
the conclusion reached by the District Court of Appeal, it 
may be pointed out that for aught that is shown in the record 
the testator, a sea captain, may and mud be presumed to have 
secured a decree of divorce in some domestic or foreign juris-
diction, the validity of which decree respondent, by virtue 
of her subsequent marriage to Nichols,is now estopped to 
deny. (See Kelley Y. MiUer (1928), 203 Cal. 61, 86·87 [263 
P. 2oo); In re Kyle (1947), 77 CaLApp.2d 634, 639·640 
[176 P.2d 96}.} The domicile of the parti61 and the place of 
diflorce become entirely immaterial where the party seeking 
10 attack the diflorce has remarried. When that circumstance 
is shown, as it is here, if there has been a divorce in any juris-
diction its effect cannot be challenged by a former .spouse 
who has accepted its benefits and remarried. 
The presumption of innocence of crime is one of the strong-
est disputable presumptions known to the law. (See discussion 
and authorities cited, infra.) As stated by Justice Peters 
(p. 94 of 193 P.2d), "even if there is 'some' evidence that 
might be interpreted to be contrary to the presumption, it 
must be conceded that such evidence is very weak indeed. 
This being ., anyl~rror in excluding evidence that might 
support the presumption takes on added significance. There 
ean he no doubt that the trial court committed error in exclud-
ing the declarations of decedent made to intimate acquaint-
ances on numerous occasions that he was divorced from 
respondent, and that she was his 'ex-wife' .•. Respondent 
concedes, as she must, that it was error to have excluded these 
declarations of relationship [see Code Civ. Proc., § 1870(4) ; 
Estate of Morgan- (1928), 203 Cal. 569 [265 P. 241} ; Estate 
of Friedman (1918), 178 CnI. 27 [172 P. 140J; Estate of 
Strong (1942), 54 Cal.App.2d 604 [129 P.2d 493)], but con-
tends that such error was not prejudicial because respondent 
had admitted that decc.>dent had declared to her that he had 
secured a divorce and 'no amonnt of additional evidence to 
the same effect could do her so much daml\ie as her own testi-
) 
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"monyon that sUbject.' (Res. Br.,:p. 6.) In other words, the 
respondent contends that the rejc~ted testimony was merely 
" cumulative, and that its rejection; was not prejudicinl. This 
, is au unrealistic approach to the question ... [T]hc probate 
I: judie seemed to be of the opinion:that the burden to show a 
" divorce rested upon appellant. and seemed to feel that that 
"burden could only be met by record evidence of a divorce. 
~i In both assumptions the trial judge was wrong. Moreover, 
~this respondent had to offer some reasou for marrying Nichols, 
~'C)therwise she would be guilty of deliberate bi~amy. Smith was 
ftnot here to deny her statements .. Nichols, although present 
~St the conversation, ,was not produced nor was his absence 
~UpJained before the probate court. To say the least, the 
P\'Vidence as to whether there was or was not a divorce from 
j;!Smith was most tenuous and uncertain, with a strong pre-
lriitmption that a divorce had been secured. Thus, to have 
~exe1uded the decedent's own statements on this subject made 
f~'to several persons on many occasions was ob,iously error of ' 
~\ most prejudicial nature. " 
~t That the burden was on respondent to prove the illegality 
<!o'bf her marriage to Nichols tberecan be no question. As pre-
~:''';''rit\",.t'V stated, the presumption of innocence of crime is one 
the strongest of the disputable presumptions known to the 
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1963; 10 Cal.Jur. 754, 762-764, 
eases tbere cited; see, also, People v. Shorts (1948), 32 
502, 507 [197 P.2d 330}.) And as declared in Es-
of Hughson (1916), 173 Cal. 448, 453 [160 P. 548], 
rt1luOting from Hunter v. Hunter (1916), 111 Cal. 261, 267 
756,52 Am.St.Rep. 180,31 L.R.A. 411}, "Tbere is also 
ana a very strong one, in favor of tbe legality 
marriage regularly solemnized. Rather than bold a 
Fitliil.iad marriage invalid and that' the parties have committed 
....",c.,..-'--- or been guilty of immorality, the courts bave often 
in the presumption of death in less tban seven 
Irj'ears. or, where the absent party was shown to be alive, bave 
~allo,ved a presumption that the absent party has procured a 
A more correct statemetlt perbaps would be that 
burden is east upon the pariy asserting guilt or immorality 
the negative-that the first marriage had not ended 
the second marriage. " 
IWInJUnU'~n1; bere, in order to meet the burden of proving 
bi5!~mlY of whicb sbe asserts she is guilty, relied in tbe 
court solely upon the fact that the testator in his 
) 
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will left $5.00 "to my wife," and upon testimony that no 
record had been found of a Reno divorce or of any California 
divorce proceedings between the parties, although search had 
been made in Reno and in all California counties except 
two. Despite the total lack of evidence that the parties had 
not been divorced elsewhere, and despite respondent's testi-
mony that the testator had declared to her that a divorce 
had been procured by him, that service had been accomplished 
by publication, that he had at that time a copy of the decree 
in 8 safety deposit bot, and that she was free to marry Nichols 
-:-a declaration which she accepted and upon which she acted 
until such time as she discovered that the testator had died 
leaving a substantial estate--the probate court found that she 
is the testator's widow. This reliance upon the words "to 
my wife" as the basis for the finding that respondent is the 
widow of decedent serves but to aggravate the prejudicial 
effect of the error in excluding the decedent's repeated 
declarations that ~ewas his "ex~wife:'''----' _ .. -- -
The portion of the judgment appealed from should be 
reversed. 
